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I Introduction 
 
The focus of this study is the application of international law by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court and ordinary courts. The purpose of the paper is to reveal whether there is any judicial 
dialogue or just a national monologue in this field. To achieve this aim, after an overview of 
the constitutional and legal framework (II), the application of the international treaties (III), 
international customary law and other sources of international law (IV) will be analysed, and 
also the interpretation of domestic law in the light of international obligations will be 
investigated (V) with special regard to ‘judicial dialogue’ (VI). 
The importance of the question is underpinned by the fact that the Hungarian 
constitutional system has been – again – in transition since 2010 and the common standards of 
the international community – such as rule of law, protection of fundamental rights and 
democracy – seem to be at risk because of the permanent revision and changes of legal norms, 
amendments to the constitution and legal uncertainty. However, it may be presupposed that 
the judicial practice on the application of international law and the judicial dialogue with 
international courts could balance the aforementioned process, if judges are aware of its 
significance and are open to international law. Common values of the European constitutional 
states governed by the rule of law are enshrined in international treaties – as the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court reaffirmed in 2012.1 The ordinary courts should consider this statement.  
 
II Constitutional Frameworks for the Application of International Law 
 
1 Constitutional Regulation 
 
In Hungary a new constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary2 (hereinafter: FL), was 
adopted on 25 April 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2012. The new constitution does 
not affect the scope of Hungary’s international commitments. However, there are permanent 
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modifications regarding the constitutional foundations and so a short overview might be 
reasonable.  
The FL expresses commitment to the international community and law (Article Q) and 
also contains a European clause mandating cooperation in the EU (Article E).3 The function 
and the purpose of these articles are similar to the corresponding rules of the former 
Constitution (Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary as revised in 
1989-90, in force until 31 December 2011; hereinafter: Constitution).4  
Article Q (2)-(3) of the FL regulates the relation between international and domestic 
law. It maintains the principle of harmony, and in respect of the ‘generally recognised rules of 
international law’ it retains the monist concept.5 This results in the customary international 
law, ius cogens and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, being the 
‘generally recognised rules of international law’ under the terminology of the FL,6 having at 
least constitutional rank in the Hungarian hierarchy of legal norms, because they can be 
regarded as part of the constitution;7 or, moreover, ius cogens norms have priority over the 
constitution.8 With regard to other sources of international law (i.e. sources other than 
‘generally recognised rules,’ such as treaties, mandatory decisions of international organs and 
certain judgements of international courts), the FL supports the dualist model with 
transformation. It still does not express the priority of international law over domestic law.9 
The ‘harmony’ shall be ensured just with those international norms to which Hungary is 
obligated and so the instruments of international soft law (e.g. recommendations, declarations, 
final acts) are excluded from the scope of the harmony rule.10 According to the detailed 
explanation of the FL, EU law also falls out of the scope of Article Q.11 
To ensure ‘harmony’, the Constitutional Court, under Article 24(2) item f) of the FL, 
will continue to review the conflict between domestic legislation and international treaties in 
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the future, but the FL neither regulates who may initiate this procedure nor refers to the 
possibility of ex officio revision. This is defined in the cardinal act on the Constitutional 
Court.12 It is not clear, either, how ‘harmony’ shall be ensured if a domestic legal act violates 
one of the ‘generally recognised rules of international law;, hence – as hitherto – it can be 
answered by constitutional interpretation. The annulment of any domestic legislation 
breaching an international treaty is optional under Article 24(3) item c) of the FL, which 
weakens the existence of the strict legal hierarchy of international law and domestic law in 
order to ensure the harmony between them. In the light of the constitutional obligation to 
ensure harmony, any international norms implemented in domestic law will take the 
incorporating provision’s place in the hierarchy of norms. Hence, deriving purely from the 
requirement of harmony, international treaties shall be placed below the constitution and 
above all ‘secondary legal sources’ (laws as well as other forms of state administration). 
However, the FL itself does not clarify the rank of norms derived from international law in the 
Hungarian hierarchy of legal norms, and the related rules are scattered: the relevant acts of 
Parliament are the Act on procedure related to international agreements and the Act on the 
Constitutional Court. 
Article E(1), as the basis of European and Union cooperation, essentially follows the 
Section 6(4) of the Constitution word for word13 and so the frame of interpretation remains 
unchanged;14 this objective expresses the commitment to each kind of European (international 
or supranational) cooperation. Article E paragraphs (2) and (4), with some simplification, 
adopts the rules of Section 2/A of the Constitution. Article E contains only one new rule 
compared to Section 2/A of the Constitution: in its paragraph (3), it states that ‘[t]he law of 
the European Union may stipulate a generally binding rule of conduct’. From the domestic 
legal viewpoint, the grounds for the constitutional validity of Union law become clearer than 
it used to be; however, this paragraph still does not solve the problem of application primacy, 
i.e. that the domestic legal act conflicting with an EU legal act is not applicable. The duty of 
the courts of law to ensure the compliance of domestic with Union law still stems from EU 
Treaties (i.e., asking for preliminary ruling), and not from the constitution itself. As such, the 
position of international law in the domestic legal system is still better defined under Article 
Q of the FL by the harmony requirement than the constitutional rank of Union law. 
 
2 Instability of the Constitutional Foundations  
 
Beyond the direct rules of Articles B and I, with respect to Articles Q and E of the FL, 
international agreements also continue to oblige Hungary to respect, protect and uphold the 
rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. These obligations thus stem from the 
constitution itself, and set such requirements which broach no exceptions. The European 
constitutions also contain similar provisions on international law with the same functions, 
reaffirming the existence of multilevel and parallel constitutionalism in the European legal 
area. As such, these kinds of constitutional provisions inherently commit and restrain the 
                                                 
12
 According to Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (2011. évi CLI. törvény az Alkotmánybíróságról), 
the revision either takes place ex officio, or upon the initiation of one-fourth of the MPs, the Government, the 
president of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Prosecutor, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, or the 
judge of any court of law if in a given case s/he shall apply a domestic legislative act conflicting with an 
international treaty. 
13
 See also Bragyova András, ‘No New(s), Good News? The Fundamental Law and the European law’ in Tóth 
Gábor Attila (ed), Constitution for a Disunited Nation (CEU Press 2012, Budapest-New York, 335-358) 335-
338. 
14
 See also Blutman László, Chronowski Nóra, ‘Hungarian Constitutional Court: Keeping Aloof from European 
Union Law’ (2011) 5 (3) International Constitutional Law 329-348. 
national governments for and by international and common European values.15 Several 
provisions of the FL, however, can also be interpreted as permitting exceptions to the 
aforementioned European requirements – pertaining to democracy, the rule of law and the 
protection of fundamental rights – and as such they could come into conflict with 
international commitments. The permanent amendments of the FL have also been widening 
the gap between international and Hungarian constitutional values. It is impossible to assess 
every amendment under the framework of this study, but it is worth mentioning that the 
erosive process had started with the Transitional Provisions of the FL (hereinafter: TP-FL) 
that were adopted by the Parliament on 30 December 2011, and came into force on 1 January 
2012.16  
The TP-FL served the coming into force of the new constitution. However, regarding 
its content, the TP-FL was in fact an amendment to it, as about half of its rules were not 
transitional at all, and some of them undermined the principles and provisions of the FL. It 
was an extremely alarming issue, concerning the basic principles of the FL, that the TP-FL 
has overruled important statements of the Constitutional Court on the right to the independent  
and impartial judge17 and undermined the provisions of the FL on judicial independence, the 
separation of church and state, division of powers, independence of the Central Bank, etc.18 
The Ombudsman requested the Constitutional Court to examine whether the Transitional 
Provisions comply with the requirements of the rule of law laid down in the FL. After the 
Ombudsman’s initiative, the Parliament adopted the First Amendment to the FL, clarifying 
that the Transitional Provisions are part of the FL. By this amendment the governing majority 
intended to avoid the constitutional review of the TP-FL, confirming its constitutional rank.19 
Despite this, the Constitutional Court ruled on the Ombudsman’s petition, declaring that all 
those provisions of the TP-FL are invalid, which did not have a transitional character.20 As a 
response, the governing majority adopted the Fourth Amendment21 of the FL, which 
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incorporates the majority of the quashed articles into the constitution. The amendment was 
firmly criticised by the Venice Commission,22 the European Parliament and the European 
Commission as it raises concerns with respect to the principle of the rule of law, EU law and 
Council of Europe standards. 
Before the Fourth Amendment some hope was given regarding ‘constitutional 
continuity,’ in that the Constitutional Court seemed to be willing to refer to its jurisprudence 
and recall the previous argumentation if the formulation of text of the FL is the same as was 
the wording of the Constitution.23 However, the Fourth Amendment of the FL has repealed 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court delivered prior to the FL entering into force.24 This 
brand new regulation reinforces the concern that the governing majority refuses the 
constitutional traditions of the last two decades.25 It undermines not just the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, but also the practice of the courts of law, which, with increasing 
frequency, referred to Constitutional Court rulings, among them to decisions related to 
international law. Although the Constitutional Court refused the substantive examination of 
the Fourth Amendment, it emphasised the importance of the international and European 
constitutional achievements,26 and later clarified that, even after the Fourth Amendment, it is 
possible to quote the former decisions under certain circumstances.27 However, the 
Constitutional Court should give stronger evidence of its commitment to international and 
European law, because it could also trigger the ordinary courts to rely on international and 
European standards, and protect the rights of individuals even against the uncertain domestic 
law. This study will not enter into predictions, because it analyses the practice of the past, but 
at this point it may be ventured to say that the constitutional uncertainty and changing 
constitutional practice is unfavourable to the application of international law in the mostly 
dualist Hungarian legal system, especially because it was not really intensive even before the 
constitutional changes of 2010-13. 
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 3. Questions Related to the Application of International Law  
 
Apart from the category of generally recognised rules of international law, the Hungarian 
legal system follows the dualist approach with transformation. The treaties are applicable after 
transformation, i.e. if they are promulgated and published in a Hungarian legal instrument (act 
of Parliament or decree of the Government).28 The procedure related to international 
agreements is regulated by Act L of 2005 and the same rules shall be applied mutatis 
mutandis to certain EU decisions, the compulsory decisions of international courts and other 
organisations.29 The Constitutional Court has competence to decide whether the incorporation 
of an international norm was constitutional, and ensure the harmony of the domestic and 
international law. For this reason, Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court is also relevant 
regarding the application of international law.30  
The Constitutional Court has a leading role in ensuring the harmony of domestic 
legislation and assumed international obligations due to its powers, but the application of the 
sources of international law in legal practice is a different aspect of harmony. Is the judge 
obliged to search for, invoke and apply the alleged international regulation binding on 
Hungary in every single case or can the judge trust the domestic legislation, which is in fact 
already in harmony with international obligations? Is the judge obliged to know that a certain 
legal question is also regulated by international obligations and is he or she expected to verify 
always that, for example, an Act to be applied in the case is in total conformity with an 
international treaty which happens to be superior to domestic legislation, except for the 
constitutional provisions? Principally the answers are all yes, and section 32 of the Act on the 
Constitutional Court prescribes for judges to turn to the Constitutional Court when they have 
to apply any domestic norm colliding with an international treaty. However, there are no 
sanctions if judges fail to do so. It is even more problematic in the question of legal practice 
related to treaty-based provisions, which are continuously interpreted by a judicial organ 
explicitly established for disputes arising from the convention itself. Certainly, the decision 
settling litigation is only binding for the parties; however, the legal reasoning and the 
exploration of the content of a provision shall form a part of the convention itself. Is the 
Hungarian judge obliged to follow the practice of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) on whether it develops the provisions of European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in a way that is different from the actual Hungarian legal practice, or is it only the 
task of the legislative power to keep the legislation updated? In the following, the study tries 
to outline the answers to the main points of these questions on the basis of the foregoing 
judicial practice. 
 
III Application of International Treaties 
 
1 Definition of the International Treaties 
 
According to Act L of 2005, an international treaty is a written agreement that is covered by 
instruments of international law, with any name or title and regardless of whether it is 
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incorporated into one, two or more interrelated documents, concluded with other States or 
other subjects of international law with the capacity to contract, which creates, modifies or 
terminates rights and obligations for Hungary under the international law.31 This definition 
complies with that of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties32 (promulgated in Law-
Decree 12 of 1987, hereinafter: Vienna Convention), and even more, it has wider scope 
covering not only treaties created by states but also by other entities (e.g. the Vatican, 
Taiwan, Order of Malta, national liberation movements, states in statu nascendi).33 The 
former regulation on the procedure related to international agreements (Law-Decree 27 of 
1982) was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2005. The Court relied, 
inter alia, on the fact that the law-decree was not in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention.34 
The courts of law therefore have to take into consideration the definition of Act L of 
2005, the rulings of the Constitutional Court, and the terminology of the Vienna Convention. 
They do not make attempts to create an independent definition of ‘international treaty’. The 
statutory definition clearly distinguishes international treaties from political commitments. 
 
2 Conditions of Direct Applicability 
 
The courts distinguish the ratified, non-ratified, approved etc. treaties on the basis of Act L of 
2005. However, because of the dualist approach, the courts apply only those treaties which are 
transformed, i.e. promulgated into a Hungarian legal act and entered into force. The courts do 
not intend to use treaties which are not in force,35 but the situation is the same as with the 
domestic legal acts – they are applied by the courts when they come into effect. If an 
international treaty comes into effect earlier than the legislator can transpose it by a domestic 
legal act, the courts have the competence to decide whether the given treaty has to be applied 
in single cases.36  
The conditions of direct applicability are the exact definition of the subjects of private 
law addressed by the international treaty and the exact specification of the rights and 
obligations under the treaty, so that the treaty can be implemented without any further act of 
legislation in all states parties.37 
According to the courts’ practice, the procedural condition of direct applicability is the 
transformation of the international treaty, and the substantive condition is whether the rights, 
duties and sanctions in the given convention are sufficiently defined for judges to apply them 
in concrete cases, and establish subjective rights upon the treaty provisions.38 It is in 
compliance with the rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
 
3 The Influence of EU Law 
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EU law has been regarded as a separate legal system by the Constitutional Court and the 
courts of law since the accession. As such the supremacy and direct applicability of EU legal 
acts are recognised; in most cases the courts ensure the effectiveness of Community/Union 
law39 but it does not really influence the application of international law, except in certain 
cases, when the applied EU legal act refers to the ECHR. The references to the principles of 
direct effect or supremacy are rather automatic;40 the courts follow the well-known textbooks 
on EU law or utilise the ministerial explanations attached to the bill of the applied Hungarian 
law. If the EU legal act refers to the ECHR, the courts then cite the referred article of the 
Convention and sometimes the landmark decisions of the ECtHR relevant in the given case, 
but only rarely do they add further interpretation or reach individualised conclusions in the 
light of the particular circumstances of the case.41 However, the Curia (former Supreme 
Court) seems to be willing to establish the triangular relationship of EU law, the ECHR and 
domestic law, and interpret the harmonised Hungarian legal acts in the light of the ECHR, if 
the implemented EC directive provides a minimum standard.42 
So far, the Constitutional Court has established two principles marking the boundaries 
of future constitutional practice. First, it will not treat the founding and amending treaties of 
the European Union as international law for the purposes of constitutional review,43 thereby 
setting up a three-tier system of legal rules applicable within Hungarian legal practice that 
distinguishes between national, international and European law. Second, in the absence of 
jurisdiction to review substantive (un)constitutionality (as opposed to procedural 
constitutionality), the Constitutional Court does not regard a conflict between domestic law 
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 Decision 1053/E/2005. AB of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, II ABH 2006, 1824. 
and EU law as a constitutionality issue44 and this mandates the ordinary courts to resolve such 
conflict of a sub-constitutional nature.45 
 
4 ECHR – the Most Popular Treaty Applied by the Hungarian Courts 
 
The Hungarian courts usually refer to the interpretations of international tribunals when they 
apply an international treaty and usually put aside the national interest. The most popular is 
definitely the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR, while foreign judgments related to the 
ECHR are never referred to. In general, the ECHR was – and in most cases is still – a point of 
reference for the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts (referred as passing comment or 
obiter dictum), but not the rationale for the decision (ratio decidendi). The Constitutional 
Court is the most consequential in the field of the application of the Convention.46 In recent 
years (2011-2013) the references of the Constitutional Court became increasingly explicit and 
definite.  
According to the Constitutional Court, if the essential content of a certain fundamental 
right in the Constitution / FL is defined in the same way as it is formulated in international 
treaties (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter: ICCPR] or the 
ECHR), the level of the fundamental rights protection provided by the Constitutional Court 
may not, under any circumstances, be lower than the level of international protection 
(typically that detailed by the ECtHR). It follows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
that the Constitutional Court shall pursue the case law of the ECtHR even if it has not been 
derived from its own previous ‘precedents’.47 To interpret and clarify a certain provision of 
the ECHR, the Constitutional Court takes as a basis the practice of the ECtHR, which body 
was authorised by the contracting parties to give an authoritative interpretation of the 
Convention. Foremost those decisions (precedents) in which the ECtHR interprets the 
Convention itself, and points out what is in compliance with it and what violates it, are taken 
as a basis.48 The interpretation of international treaties given by the Constitutional Court 
obviously shall coincide with the official interpretation given by the Council of Europe.49 
Molnár even assessed the phenomenon as if the Constitutional Court was stating 
‘double unconstitutionality’ by declaring first the collision with – or potential infringement of 
– the ECHR, and second the ‘domestic unconstitutionality’ upon the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Constitution or FL.50 The best examples for this are the Constitutional Court 
Decisions 1/2013. (I. 7.) on electoral registration and 4/2013. (II. 21.) on using a five-pointed 
red star.51 In the latter case, the Constitutional Court explicitly overruled its previous practice 
on criminalising the use of totalitarian symbols with regard to the decisions of ECtHR related 
to Hungary. In these decisions the ECtHR rulings seem to determine the ratio decidendi 
indeed and they do not remain just obiter dictum. 
The ordinary courts also respect the ECHR and they should also respect the case law 
of the ECtHR; however, their practise is neither unambiguous nor consistent in this field. The 
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Strasbourg case law does not fall within the scope of Act L of 2005 and so it does not bind the 
courts on a formal basis.52 It is also true that government communication or action in certain 
cases might indirectly influence the enforcement of international courts’ judgments, but the 
effect of the expressed ‘national interest’ has not yet appeared in the domestic courts’ 
decisions. Concerning the legal effect of a decision by an international judicial body, the 
reaction of the legislative power is recently something to be worried about. As regards the 
Fratanoló case53 the Parliament adopted a resolution declaring that the alleged provision of 
the Hungarian Criminal Code is correct and, even if the ECHR stated otherwise, the 
Parliament does not agree with the opinion of the ECtHR.54 However, this attitude of the 
Parliament does not impede ordinary courts to follow the ECtHR decision and, on the same 
day of the adoption of the negative declaration of the Parliament, the Supreme Court rendered 
a Strasbourg-conformant judgment and relieved the accused on the grounds that no crime had 
been committed in the view of the ECtHR according to its decision in a similar case.55 
All in all, the above-mentioned rulings of the Constitutional Court may encourage the 
ordinary courts to follow the ECtHR practice as well. Despite this, there were cases when the 
ordinary court completely refused to apply the ECtHR judgments referred to by the plaintiff,56 
or the court of appeal clarified for the court of first instance that, although the judgments of 
the ECtHR must be taken into consideration, it does not mean that – regarding the differences 
between the applicable law and the parties concerned – it could be implemented generally and 
automatically.57  
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 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal 5.Pf.20.736/2010/6. The subject matter of the case 
was the right to a judicial decision within a reasonable time, and the court of first instance referred to Article 6 of 
the ECHR, several judgement of the ECtHR, even the jurisprudence (textbooks, German commentaries), and 
interpreted Article 2 of the Hungarian Civil Procedure Code (CPC) in that light. Section 2 of the CPC provides 
for the courts to ensure the right to completion of the trials within reasonable time. Article 6 of ECHR guarantees 
the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. The judge assessed that the CPC shall be 
interpreted in compliance with the ECHR, and the right to completion of the trial shall not be restricted to the 
An opposite (but rare) example is the landmark judgment in the Hungarian Guard 
case. The Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal directly applied the ECHR, and 
deliberated the admissibility of the restriction of the given fundamental right (i.e., dissolution 
of the association and movement concerned) on the basis of ECtHR measures. Thus, instead 
of relying on the Constitution and the necessity – proportionality test of the Constitutional 
Court, the criteria drawn up under Article 10 of the ECHR were implemented (i.e. the 
restriction is prescribed by law, has a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic 
society). The court also referred to the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination (New York, 1965), so as to strengthen the argumentation.58 
Concerning the practice on international judicial decisions, the ECtHR is the most frequently 
cited; however, it happens that, in the reasoning, decisions of the ECtHR which are only 
indirectly connected to the case are cited and invoked, and sometimes the foreign names of 
these decisions are even misspelled. The famous Babus case of the Budapest-Capital Regional 
Court of Appeal is an example of the significance of ECtHR judgments in the interpretation 
and clarification of the Hungarian legal practice, and at the same time it serves as an anti-
example for the application of international law as well, through the decoration of reasoning 
with irrelevant and incorrectly cited decisions of the ECtHR.59 
In has to be noted that, in the practice of ordinary courts, there is a group of cases that 
reveal the application of international law; those containing a foreign element and 
international law has a significant role in the reasoning of the judgment, a definitive one or at 
least complementary. These cases are related to double taxation,60 the calculation of social 
allowances such as old age pension61 for those who lived a part of their life abroad – in a non-
EU Member State or before the accession of Hungary – and, in most instances, litigation 
concerning the carriage of goods. Altogether, beyond human rights-related issues and the 
ECHR, the most frequently cited international instrument, among other bilateral treaties in the 
subject,62 is the 1956 Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of 
Goods by Road (CMR).63 
 
IV References to Customary International Law and Other Sources of International Law 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
right to a final judgment; instead it also covers the interim decisions and the hearings during the whole 
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58
 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal 5.Pf.20.738/2009/7. 
59
 Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal Decision 3.Bhar.341/2009/6. Koltay András, ‘A Fővárosi 
Ítélőtábla határozata Babus Endre újságíró rágalmazási ügyében’ (2010) 1 (3) Jogesetek Magyarázata 33-38, 35. 
60
 See, for example, Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Hungary for the avoidance 
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital. 30 August in Supreme Court Decision 
Kfv.I.35.460/2007/8 and Bács-Kiskun County Court Decision K.21.858/2006/17. 
61
 See, for example, Agreement on social security between the Hungarian Republic and the Republic of Austria, 
7 September, 1961 in Supreme Court Decision MfvK.IV.10.206/2007/4., Municipal Court of Budapest Decision 
Mfv/K.III.11.015/2006/5.; Convention between the Hungarian People’s Republic and Federal Republic of 
Germany on social security, 2 May, 1998 in Győr-Moson-Sopron County Court Decision 9.K.27.302/2007/10. 
62
 See, for example, Convention between the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the carriage of persons and goods, 9 February, 1972 in 
Supreme Court Decisions Kfv.I.35.063/2007/6 and Kfv.I.35.411/2006/5; Kfv.I.35.107//2007/5. Agreement 
between the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria on the carriage of persons and goods in Supreme Court Decision Kfv.I.35.103/2007/. 
63
 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road opened for signature 19 May 
1956 399 UNTS 189 (entered into force 2 July 1961) See the application of the convention for example, 
Supreme Court Decisions Kfv.I.35.259/2010/7.; Kfv.V.39.138/2010/7; Gfv. X.30.302/2009/4; 
Gfv.IX.30.095/2010/4; Gfv.X.30.186/2008/6; Gfv.X.30.239/2007/4; Gfv.X.30.342/2009/5. 
1 Customary International Law  
 
The terminology ‘customary international law’ is used neither in the text of the FL, nor in that 
of the Constitution; it is covered by the term ‘generally recognised rules of international 
law’.64 It is generally transformed into the domestic legal system by Article Q(3) of the FL 
and cannot derogate the provisions of the FL.65 According to constitutional judge Péter 
Kovács, the question of the technical solution that transformed international rules can be 
debated but the fact that the principle of pacta sunt servanda obliges Hungary is 
unquestionable.66 
The Constitutional Court refers to customary international law in the form of its 
codified version. Sometimes the Constitutional Court only adds the information that the cited 
norm is a generally recognised rule of international law but it relies, for its argumentation, on 
the treaty provision that involves the customary international law in question.67 There is no 
sharp separation among the generally recognised rules of international law; thus, for instance 
in decision 32/2008. (III. 12.), the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine 
lege are declared as fundamental principles of international law;68 and the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda is referred to as ius cogens and customary international law as well. 69 
Moreover, the qualification is important as ius cogens can prevail even over the FL.70 
The practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court includes only a small number of 
cases in which customary international law appears. These cases refer to the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege and the rule that war crimes and crimes against humanity shall be 
punished without statutory limitation is declared to be ius cogens.  It is to be noted, that the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege also constitutes customary international law.71 
In decision 53/1993. (X. 13.), the Constitutional Court pursued a preliminary norm control 
concerning the modification of the Hungarian Criminal Code and its conformity with 
international norms relating to the prescription of crimes regulated by common Article 2 and 
3 of the Geneva Conventions. Concerning these kinds of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, the Constitutional Court derived the legal basis for punishability without time limit 
from the fact that they are considered ius cogens as they threaten the whole of humankind. 
In decision 32/2008. (III. 12.), for instance, the argumentation of the Constitutional Court 
concerning the criminality of war crimes and crimes against humanity prescribed by universal 
principle of international customary law is declared to be effective in domestic law through 
the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Constitution. The obligations issuing from this norm are 
analysed and interpreted in the view of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which is 
declared in the ECHR and in the ICCPR; however, the provisions of these conventions 
contain exceptions which allow the retroactive effect of the customary norm of criminality of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. These sources of international law mean 
international legal obligations to be taken into account as Section 57(4) of the Constitution – 
and Article XXVIII(4) of the FL – declaring the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in 
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domestic law does not contain any exceptions from the general ban.72 It is noteworthy, 
however, that since 2011 – on the bases of the aforementioned Constitutional Court decisions 
– Article XXVIII (5) of the FL limits the prohibition related to the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. 
Concerning the practice of ordinary courts, only domestic customary law is applied except for 
the nine so-called ‘volley cases’. The term refers to the prosecutions of gunfire against 
unarmed civilians but it became used in connection with the prosecution of all criminal acts 
committed in the period of the 1956 revolution, thus including such crimes as extrajudicial 
executions.73 The Parliament adopted a statute in 1993 on “the procedure to follow in case of 
certain crimes committed during the 1956 war of independence and revolution” that made 
possible the punishment of crimes against humanity and war crimes without statutory 
limitation. Decision 53/1993. (X. 13.) of the Constitutional Court stated that the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege is not to be applied in such cases, as the non-application of statutory 
limitation for the above mentioned crimes is the order of international customary law and ius 
cogens.74 Although the Act of 1993 was declared to be unconstitutional and annulled in 1996 
for other reasons, the volley trials were however judged in the light of the statements of the 
1993 decision of the constitutional Court and so the courts applied the customary international 
norm while delivering the judgments in these cases.75  
 
2 ‘Other Sources of International Law’ 
 
The Constitutional Court frequently refers to the resolutions of international organisations to 
clarify treaty-based obligations. 
As regards binding resolutions of international organisations, the FL does not contain 
any provisions; however, there are many international organisations that make binding 
decisions. The UN Security Council is a well-known example.76 As for the transformation of 
Security Council decisions, Hungarian practice is incoherent, confusing and contradictory. 
Sometimes they are promulgated by government decrees or regulations and very rarely by 
acts.77 Sometimes (such as many of the resolutions concerning sanctions against Iraq, Angola, 
Sierra Leone and Afghanistan) they do not even appear in the Hungarian legal system,78 and it 
happens quite often that they are published in the form of a Foreign Office bulletin 
(külügyminiszteri tájékoztató). This latter solution is a monist technique; as such, this kind of 
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publication of resolutions is absolutely contrary to the provisions concerning Hungarian legal 
order and legal certainty.79 In legal practice it causes problems in determining the applicable 
law. For example, during the years of the Yugoslav Wars, the SC imposed an arms embargo 
over the whole territory of the former state. A smuggler was arrested on Hungarian territory 
and convicted of violating it but at second instance the judgment was modified and he was 
discharged. In fact the embargo was suspended for a while but at the time of the crime it was 
in force again.80 The earlier resolution suspending the embargo was promulgated late, so at 
the time of the trial of the second instance the judge could only rely on the Foreign Office 
bulletin providing for the suspension. The result was that the act committed was not qualified 
as a crime at the time of the appellate procedure, despite the fact that at that time Yugoslavia 
was embargoed again, as the latter resolution providing for it was not promulgated in time.81 
As for non-binding resolutions, the recommendations and resolutions of the competent organs 
of the Council of Europe are frequently invoked as relevant interpretations of ECHR 
provisions and the Constitutional Court relies many times on these sources as guidance. Many 
resolutions and recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers 
or the Venice Commission are cited to interpret and clarify obligations; in general they are 
therefore invoked in the company of treaty-based provisions and ECHR judgments and, most 
of the time, they are not the source and basis of the final decision, just the support for the 
argumentation based on domestic law. In these cases the terms and phrases used, such as 
Parliamentary Assembly also urges or the opinion of the Constitutional Court is in 
accordance with […] reveal of the purpose of citation.82 The same can be observed regarding 
the decisions of the United Nations and its specialised agencies and the communications of 
the institutions of the EU. For instance, when the Constitutional Court had to decide upon a 
case in which the rights of homosexual people were concerned, the Court invoked many 
international instruments to evince the conformity of domestic law with international 
standards.83 
It is rare but not unique for these instruments to form an integral part of the reasoning 
and the formation of the final decision; however, in such cases they are always accompanied 
by treaty-based provisions and judicial practice to replace and complement the lack of 
constitutional practice related to a fundamental right.84 
Regarding the available decisions, ordinary courts rarely invoke non-binding 
instruments of international law, except by referring to Constitutional Court decisions that 
analyse or refer to them. As such, direct citation of non-binding international legal 
instruments is not practiced.85 
 
V Interpretation of Domestic Law in the Light of International Obligations 
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 1 ‘Indirect Application’ of International Law 
 
The Constitutional Court declared that domestic law shall be made and interpreted in the view 
of international obligations, no matter whether the obligation issues from customary 
international law or is incorporated in a treaty.86 Using international law as an interpretational 
tool is based on Article Q (2) of the FL. The problem arises in connection with non-binding 
sources of international law; however, constitutional judge Péter Kovács noted that invoking 
them would help the positivist foundation of argumentation.87 Blutman says that, due to its 
independence, the Constitutional Court is free to choose its tools for the argumentation and 
interpretation. Only the validity, causality and verifiability of conclusions form limitations to 
the interpretation.88 The aim is to devise a politically and ideologically neutral judgment. It 
can easily be achieved by considering the (non-binding) decisions of international 
organisations and interpretative solutions of judgments of third States’ courts. 89 
Obligation derived from the FL means that the Hungarian State takes part in the 
community of nations and this participation is constitutional order for domestic law.90 The 
basis of international cooperation is formed by common principles and goals, which are subtly 
affected by non-binding norms and expectations to ensure the peace and good functioning of 
interactions. The State can avoid many of these norms but it cannot extricate herself from the 
whole system, as it would mean isolation from the community. Participation in the 
community of nations hence presumes the application of international norms containing social 
and moral standards as instruments for interpretation. In this way the citation of non-binding 
international documents and foreign jurisprudence as a tool for interpreting the Fundamental 
Law can be justified.91 
According to Blutman, the main question is whether the FL creates the obligation to 
use, or at least consider, the application of these instruments as well. In his view, the 
obligation of participation in international cooperation cannot transform those norms that are 
not undertaken explicitly by Hungary, as it would be contrary to the principle of rule of law, 
legal certainty and the content of Section 7(1) of the Constitution (now Article Q of the FL) as 
well. However, non-binding norms might be taken into consideration to interpret norms that 
oblige the State.92 
Regarding the available decisions, ordinary courts, most of the time, invoke the 
practice of the ECtHR if the case before them concerns Fundamental Law issues, in order to 
interpret domestic legal provisions correctly (mainly in those cases when they are quite 
ambivalent or do not seem to be in conformity with international obligations).93 It is not rare 
that the ECtHR practice is invoked in the form that it was discussed and analysed in a 
Constitutional Court decision, and the relevant decisions of the ECtHR are not cited directly,94 
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or only the ‘practice of the ECtHR’ is invoked without any exact decision to support the 
statement.95 
 
2 The Effect of International Legal Instruments on the Reasoning 
 
International law has constitutive effect on the reasoning when it serves the basis for the 
judgement. For example in 1993 the Hungarian Parliament passed a law on Procedures 
Concerning Certain Crimes Committed during the 1956 Revolution. This law tried to make 
possible some form of ‘historical justice’ in order to prosecute Communist offenders as they 
committed crimes against humanity. The President of the Republic did not promulgate the act, 
but turned to the Constitutional Court for a preventive norm control. The President asked the 
Court to review the law for its conformity with both the Constitution and two international 
agreements, Article 7 of the ECHR and Article 15 of the ICCPR, which declared the 
principles of nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege. The constitutionality of the provision 
referring to war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined by the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, was upheld. The Constitutional Court cited the 
New York Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity of 1968 which declares that no statutory limitation shall apply to 
several categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity, irrespective of the date of their 
commission.96 By signing and ratifying this convention, Hungary undertook an obligation not 
to apply its own statute of limitations in cases involving war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.97 The Constitutional Court even highlighted the fact that the possibility of ignoring 
the principle of nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege with regard to these kinds of crimes 
is based on customary international law and so the non-applicability of statutory limitations 
obliges Hungary without any conventional provisions.98 
International law has additional constitutive effect when the international norm plays a 
supplementary role in the reasoning with other national legislative acts. In this case the final 
decision is based on the two types of sources as well, with the same emphasis. For example, 
in 1990 capital punishment was declared to be unconstitutional. The relevant provisions of the 
Criminal Code which permitted capital punishment as a criminal sanction conflicted with the 
constitutional prohibition against any limitation on the essential content of the right to life and 
to human dignity. This statement based on the Constitution was supplemented by international 
obligations and thus it is clarified as such: capital punishment conflicts with provisions that 
declares that human life and human dignity form an inseparable unit, thus having a greater 
value than other rights; and thus being an indivisible, absolute fundamental right limiting the 
punitive powers of the State. The reasoning is based on the relevant articles of the ICCPR;99 
and the ECHR with its Protocol no. 6 dealing with the right to life.100 These international 
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norms clarified the provisions of the Constitution in the light of (partly prospective) 
international obligations and so they had a significant role in the final reasoning of the 
decision.101 International law has a supportive effect in those cases whereby the reference to 
international legal instruments is to strengthen a decision based on domestic law. 
Recommendations of the Council of Europe are frequently invoked as relevant interpretation 
of the provisions of the ECHR, and the Constitutional Court relies many times on these 
sources as guidance (as with the judgments and decisions of international judicial organs to 
support argumentation), or to justify that the opinion of the Constitutional Court in the 
reasoning is in accordance with international standards and international obligations; thus 
recommendations are not the sources of obligation, they are not the norms to apply; they are 
only the tools of interpretation of treaty based international obligations. 
As regards the practice of ordinary courts, in the most cases the invocation of 
international law has only supportive effect, and there are very few cases where international 
law plays a significant role in the reasoning of the court. When international law has a 
constitutive effect on the case, it is usually the practice of the CJEU or that of the ECtHR 
which forms the basis of the reasoning. The common feature of these cases is that the 
applicable law is deduced from the jurisprudence. As regards the ECHR practice, the Supreme 
Court carried out a detailed analysis of Article 6 (the right to fair trial) and 8 (the right to 
respect for private and family life, home and correspondence) of the Convention in 
connection with a case on the legality of perquisition.102 
 
VI Conclusions on Judicial Dialogue 
 
1 On ‘Dialogue’ in General 
 
Dialogue is when two (or more) participants, in an equal position, seek agreement via an 
exchange of views, generally in order to achieve some joint outcome. The precondition of the 
dialogue is the near identical or similar position of the participants, which primarily occurs at 
the level of powers and influence, and from this perspective, assumes identical weight. The 
dialogue is actually a specific form of debate; therefore it shall be distinguished from general 
discussion and consultation as well. As a specific form of debate, some criteria may be 
outlined that characterise dialogue, without which the parties would misunderstand each 
other.  
First, the dialogue assumes a common goal or, if you prefer, a common subject on 
which the dialogue proceeds. The dialogue may never end by itself. The second criterion is 
the commitment to the common goal. All participants want to achieve the common goal, 
which is to eliminate or reduce the conflict, and the debate or their individual interests shall be 
subordinated to this goal.  Regularity is also an important feature of the dialogue. The 
dialogue is rarely a single exchange of views, because the interests of the participants are 
usually complex. The fourth characteristic of a dialogue is that the parties strive to be 
conclusive and effective. All of them are interested in conflict resolution, and therefore they 
are willing to ‘sacrifice’, i.e., to give up some parts of their own interests in order to reach a 
compromise outcome, because this is usually preferable for everyone than enforcing their 
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individual interests. Finally mutuality must be mentioned, which should characterise all of the 
participants. Mutuality also encompasses concession, empathy, tolerance, etc. The meaning of 
a dialogue is not overcoming each other, but to achieve a common goal. 
 
2 Hungarian Courts and International Judgments 
 
A focal question is whether, and to what extent, the Hungarian courts consider the judgments 
of international courts. Do they just simply refer to them, or do they reflect on them by 
overruling their own, prior jurisprudence? The latter would prove the existence of judicial 
dialogue; the former, however, is not enough to satisfy the criteria of the dialogue. 
The decisions of the ECtHR as well as the decisions of the CJEU are not considered as 
direct sources of international law; instead, they are interpretations. In decision 18/2004. (V. 
25.), the Constitutional Court declared that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR forms and obliges 
the Hungarian practice. This kind of obligation refers to the interpretation of the different 
provisions of the Convention and not to the judgment itself.103 In decision 988/E/2000 the 
Constitutional Court highlighted that the judgment of the International Court of Justice is 
neither a norm nor a treaty. It decided upon a unique legal dispute even if its statements have 
theoretical significance and become precedent.104 Two years later the new act on the 
procedure regarding the treaties was adopted and it reformulates this opinion by stating that 
decisions are binding and shall be executed in Hungary if the state is a party to the settled 
dispute. This decision shall be promulgated with the appropriate application of the provisions 
regarding the promulgation of the treaties in the Official Gazette.105 As for the form of 
promulgation, it is the form of the compromis (the agreement between opposing parties to turn 
to a judicial forum to settle a dispute) that is determinative. It is to be noted that this 
obligation shall not refer to decisions in litigation where the other party to the dispute is a 
private individual and not a state, just like in the case of ECtHR.106 In such cases only Section 
13(1) of Act L of 2005 obliges Hungary to consider the decisions of the organ having 
jurisdiction over the disputes in relation to the treaty in the course of interpreting it. In this 
case the decision is not a source of law; however, it can be a significant guidance for the 
interpretation of treaty-based obligations.107 
In general, ordinary courts frequently cite international court decisions and mainly 
those of the ECtHR, but they rarely use the reasoning and the fundamental legal statements 
directly in the argumentation in their own cases. In many cases, the citation of the judicial 
practice of the ECtHR is given even without invoking expressis verbis the relevant 
judgment,108 or the practice is invoked indirectly by citing the statements of the Constitutional 
Court based on the practice of the ECtHR. This phenomenon is mainly seen in the judicial 
activity of the Municipal Court of Budapest.109 
Concerning the practice of domestic courts at a lower level, sometimes the application 
of international judicial decisions is beyond the scope of domestic norms. For instance, the 
interpretation and application of the benchmark of good faith established by the ECtHR is far 
beyond the provisions of the Hungarian Criminal Code concerning defamation and libel and 
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the dogmatic frames and bases. Thus, the applications of ECtHR decisions to support the 
argumentation related to the meaning of bona fides in the case of a journalist called Babus 
directly conflicted with the relevant decision, echoing the Hungarian constitutional practice, 
of the Constitutional Court [36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB].110 
 
3 Dialogue or Monologue? – Final Conclusions 
 
Applying the general features of dialogue to the courts, one can conclude that the basic 
condition – an equal position – is given if we consider the powers and status of, say, the 
ECtHR, the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts of last instance. As to the common goal 
and the commitment to that – the first and second specific conditions – it may be supposed 
that the analysed courts are to protect fundamental rights and common constitutional values, 
but these are very broad and abstract common goals. The concrete goal of each court is to 
solve a given case, or safeguard the ECHR or the Constitution in line with its function, and 
the way they reach this goal is influenced by the circumstances of the given case, the 
references of the parties concerned, and the presumption of the judges regarding the ratio 
decidendi. The latter also interferes with regularity, because the Hungarian courts usually 
refer to international sources only if it supports the reasoning or has stronger persuasive force 
than the purely domestic legal based argumentation. Fourth, the courts have no conflict with 
each other; hence – although they respect each others' statements and rulings – they do not 
need to be conclusive and effective in this respect. Sometimes the domestic courts seem to be 
rather careful or reticent over the interpretation of international treaties – maybe they try to 
avoid a potential future conflict with the international court interpreting the given treaty 
authoritatively. Of course if all role-players – i.e. courts – agree that the conflict can be traced 
back to a given piece of domestic law infringing a normative international commitment, and 
the procedural conditions are available (their procedures were initiated, at least one of them 
has power to eliminate the concerned norm, they have appropriate procedural ties between 
each other), the international and domestic courts may cooperate effectively by referring to 
each other's decisions. Finally, in the ‘dialogue’ of the courts, mutual respect can be observed 
and rivalry is a really rare phenomenon, but it is also true that courts are not compelled to give 
mutual concessions.  
As such, as a final conclusion, it can be stated that the Hungarian courts apply 
international law if they have to or they want to decorate their reasoning with it, but it is still 
far from a constructive dialogue. Hungarian courts already listen to the international courts, 
because they refer to the decisions when applying international law, but rarely do they answer 
– i.e. revise their former practice. Even the judgments of the ECtHR do not have a strong 
position, as they are – according to the Hungarian courts – just of a declaratory nature.  
The principle of iura novit curia is known and accepted by the Hungarian courts.111 The 
efficient – and not just effective – application of international law and response to the 
international courts’ judgments might help the preservation of the values common to liberal 
democratic societies. It is up to the judges to recognise that they have a role to play in 
maintaining the shared constitutional values of European states. 
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